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Racism and impeachment power
any commentators have de
nounced Presid~nt Donald
Trump as a racist following the
vulgar and derogatory comments he
reportedly made about Haiti, El Sal
vador, Africa and immigrants from
these places. In fact, some have gone
so far as to say that the president's
perceived racism should lead
Congress to remove him from office.
Are they correct? Does racism con
stitute a legitimate basis for removing
a president? More generally, what is
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the scope of Congress's removal
power?
In all but the most extraordinary
circumstances, the remedy for incom
petent political leadership - indeed,
even abhorrent political leadership 
lies in the next election. But the Con
stitution does provide Congress with
tools to remove certain federal office
holders between elections.
As explained in a recent column
("Sexual misconduct, abuse of power
SEE CONSTITUTION 03

Impeachment is a tool of last resort, so when should it be used?
been interpreted to apply to
federal judges, who do not
and congressional self-gover face electoral recall but
nance," Sunday Monitor Fo
rather "hold their Offices dur
ing good Behavior" (Article
rum, Nov. 26), the Constitu
tion authorizes each house of Ill, section 1).
Congress to "expel a Mem
In terms of mechanics, the
ber" with "the Concurrence of Constitution vests the House
two thirds" of its other mem
of Representatives with the
"sole Power of impeachment"
bers (Article I, section 5,
(Article I, section 2, clause 5).
clause 2). Thus, Congress
holds the power to remove its As with nearly all of its other
own members who engage in
powers, the House may vote
to impeach by a simple major
malfeasance.
ity vote. The Constitution then
The Constitution also au
vests the Senate with the
thorizes Congress to appoint
the vice president to serve as "sole Power to try all im
acting president "by two
peachments," and further
thirds vote of both Houses" if provides that "no Person shall
be convicted without the Con
the vice president and a ma
currence of two thirds of the
jority of the Cabinet transmit
to Congress a written declara Members present" (Article I,
tion that the president "is un section 3, clause 6).
So what are the "high
able to discharge the powers
Crimes and Misdemeanors"
and duties of his office"
(Amendment 25, section 4).
that can ground an article of
Then there is the impeach impeachment? The Constitu
ment power. The Constitution tion does not say and the fed
eral judiciary - mindful that
provides that "the President,
Vice p ,r esident and all civil Of impeachment is Congress's
prerogative and the principal
ficers of the United States,
check it holds over federal
shall be removed from Office
on Impeachment for, and Con judges - has long treated im
viction of, Treason, Bribery, or peachment-related matters as
other high Crimes and Misde non-justiciable "political"
meanors" (Article II, section
questions. Thus, there is a
wide range of perspectives on
4). This provision also has
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the issue.
At one end of the spectrum
is the belief that only criminal
acts that seriously threaten
our political order should trig
ger impeachment. At the
other end is the view, ex
pressed by former President
Gerald Ford when he was a
member of Congress, that "an
impeachable offense is what
ever a majority of the House
of Representatives considers
(it) to be."
Between these positions,
there is fairly widespread
agreement that impeachment
should be reserved for con
duct that undermines our es
tablished constitutional order,
subverts foundational norms,
and cannot readily be ad
dressed through ordinary po
litical or judicial processes.
Thus, impeachment should
not be used for mere political
disagreements, no matter
how deeply felt. Moreover, not
all criminal acts by federal of
fice-holders subject to im
peachment actually should
lead to impeachment. And yet,
actions that are not criminal
can properly serve as a basis
for impeachment if they
threaten basic government
functioning.

l

Under these principles,
should a conscientious mem
ber of Congress seriously con
sider voting to impeach a
president believed to be a
racist?
To do so in good faith, the
member must focus on the
president's official conduct.
The member should ask
whether the president's
racism is causing him to exer
cise his vast discretion to in
terpret and enforce federal
law in a manner that is, 1) in
consistent with constitutional
norms, and 2) not easily coun
teracted through ordinary pol
itics or litigation.
If a conscientious member
of Congress were to conclude
that the president's racism is
affecting federal policy, these
two criteria could be satisfied.
First, the Constitution's
promise of "equal protection
of the laws" makes the con
sideration of race, religion,
ethnicity or national origin in
executing or enforcing federal
law unconstitutional in all but
the rarest of circumstances.
At the cost of immense hu
man suffering, we have estab
lished as a basic norm that
government should not use
any of these characteristics

as proxies for merit.
Second, the administration
can easily insulate policy deci
sions affected by such consid
erations from effective chal
lenge by presenting and justi
fying them in non-discrimina
tory language.
Consider, as one of many
possible examples, the admin
istration's recent decision to
scale back Justice Depart
ment efforts to engage in "col
laborative reform" of local po
lice departments - and to im
prove police-community rela
tions - in the aftermath of re
cent police shootings of black
men.
The administration justi
fied its decision in terms of a
need for greater federal re
spect for local police morale
and safety. Certainly, these
are non-discriminatory and
important policy considera
tions. Moreover, the decision
is squarely within the presi
dent's law-enforcement power
and discretion. Consequently,
even if a conscientious mem
ber of Congress were con
vinced that the president's
racial views also affected the
decision, there is little that
she could do within ordinary
political or legal processes to

counteract it.
In such circumstances, a
conscientious member of
Congress could consider im
peachment - particularly if
she were to conclude that the
example was not isolated but
rather was a part of a broader
pattern of racially discrimina
tory administrative policy
making.
Impeachment is strong
medicine. Most understand
that routinely deploying it as
part of partisan politics would
endanger the republic. And
there seems to be little likeli
hood that today's calls for im
peachment will go anywhere
while the president's party
holds the balance of power in
Congress.
But given that lawmakers
have placed impeachment on
the table, it is essential that
we have a serious public dis
cussion of when this tool of
last resort ought to be used.
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